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FINANCIAL STABILITY AND POLICY COOPERATION 
Vítor Gaspar 
Garry Schinasi 
Abstract:  Within  the  context  of  the  Global  Crisis,  this  paper  examines  the  ongoing  policy 
challenges in establishing a European framework for financial regulation and supervision. We 
do so taking into account the evidence provided during the crisis of pervasive spillover effects 
and cross-country interdependence. The paper applies game-theoretic models as tools to think 
about the cross-country aspects of European financial integration over time. Specifically, the 
paper applies the economic theory of alliances of Olson and Zechauser (1966) and the private 
provision  of  public  goods  of  Bergstrom,  Blume  and  Varian  (1986).  We  contrast  the  non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium allocation with cooperative (Coase) outcomes. The latter can be 
expected to obtain under zero transaction costs. We follow Coase in taking zero transaction 
costs as a benchmark to examine the factors that may favor (or hinder) cooperation in specific 
circumstances. We consider the importance of iterated interactions through the theory of 
repeated  games,  case  studies,  and  experimental  evidence  to  identify  factors  favoring  or 
hindering successful cooperation. The total number of participants, time, foresight, multiple 
equilibria,  leadership,  the  magnitude  and  volatility  of  gains  and  losses,  imperfect  and 
asymmetric information, decision and bargaining costs, monitoring, and enforcement are all 
important factors. In the paper we stress the importance of an institutional approach that 
minimizes obstacles to reaching cooperative outcomes. We highlight the need for effective 
procedures to deal with systemic risk, an agreed set of rules underpinning the single European 
financial  market  (e.g.  state  aid  rules  and  a  single  rule  book),  and  effective  restructuring, 
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I.  INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION. 
 
The Global Crisis became acute in the late summer of 2008. By the autumn, the combination of 
sharply falling economic activity and trade around the globe, along with severely impaired and 
dysfunctioning  financial  markets  and  institutions,  brought  to  mind  images  and  fears 
reminiscent of the Great Depression of the 1930s. The threat of a debt-deflation spiral loomed 
large.  
A  main  difference  between  the  Great  Depression  and  the  Global  Crisis  was  in  the  policy 
responses. These included: first, an aggressive easing of monetary policies through interest 
rates cuts and central bank support through other  policy tools, including the provision of 
emergency liquidity assistance; second, financial policies aimed at avoiding systemic financial 
collapse,  including  the  provision  of  government  capital  injections  and  guarantees;  third, 
expansionary  budgetary  policies;  and,  fourth,  policies  aimed  at  facilitating  structural 
adjustments and long run stability and sustainability. 
The  Global  Crisis  affected  almost  all  countries  in  an  unprecedented  synchronous  way. 
Interdependence and spillover effects were widespread and costly. This was particularly so in 
the  autumn  of  2008  and  in  financial  markets.  More  recently,  the  Global  Crisis  has  had  a 
significant  impact  on  government  debt  markets,  raising  (again)  issues  of  contagion  and 
spillover effects.  
Because of these unique features, the global crisis provides an opportunity to examine and 
reflect  upon  the  practice  and  effectiveness  of  continental  and  global  international  policy 
coordination and cooperation in the financial stability space. In fact, in this space, the policy 
response to the crisis included a fifth and most important element: international cooperation. 
This element can most clearly be seen  in the intensification of European coordination and in a 3 
 
new, more inclusive form of global cooperation at the head-of-state level, namely the new G20 
process.  
Notably, during the crisis, although most actions were taken at the national level, there was an 
unprecedented willingness on the part of sovereign nations to consider and engage in joint 
action and to pursue a multilateral approach (e.g. on trade and on financial regulation and 
supervision) so as to avoid going backwards on international integration and globalization. In 
November 2008, at the peak of the crisis, the Heads of State of the Group of Twenty (G-20) 
met  for  the  first  time  to  discuss  a  cooperative  policy  approach  aimed  at  restoring  global 
financial and economic stability. This represented a turning point for international governance, 
both politically and psychologically. The meeting was followed up on April 2, 2009 with the G-
20 summit in London and, again, on September 25-26, 2009, in Pittsburgh. 
The tension between national action and international cooperation was also clear in Europe. 
Over  time,  the  European  Union  has  achieved  an  unprecedented  degree  of  international 
integration.  This is so in many dimensions (cultural, social, political, economic and financial), 
but  the  progress  in  European  integration  can  be  symbolized  in  two  projects:  the  single 
European market and the single currency (the euro).  
The  single  market  and  the  single  currency  have  required  (and  will  continue  to  require)  a 
degree of institutional maturity unmatched at the international level. Interdependence and 
spillover effects from unilateral national actions were extremely strong and visible during the 
crisis in the European Union in general, and in the euro area, in particular. In this context, it is 
not surprising that on October 12, 2009, euro area countries met for the first time at the level 
of Heads of State and Government. The meeting, which took place under French Presidency, 
aimed at drawing “a joint action plan for the Euro Area Member States and the European 
Central Bank in response to the current financial crisis.”
1 
Already in October 8, 2008, the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, 
established  a  high-level  group,  chaired  by  Jacques  de  Larosière,  to  consider  and  propose 
changes  to  the  European  regulatory  and  supervisory  architecture.  The  group  reported  on 
February 25, 2009. The main innovations recommended in the de Larosière Report were, first, 
the creation of a European Systemic Risk Board with a mandate to deal with macro-prudential 
systemic  risk;  and  second,  the  creation  of  a  European  System  of  Financial  Supervision 
comprised of three new European supervisory authorities dealing with banking, securities and 
insurance  and  occupational  pensions.  These  new  agencies  will  have  binding  powers  when 
dealing  with  individual  cases.  They  constitute  the  first  ever  supra-national  operational 
supervisory authorities. The European Commission produced formal legislative proposals in 
the  autumn  of  2009.  At  the  time  of  writing  (June  2010),  these  proposals  are  under 
consideration by the European Parliament.  
In the autumn of 2009, the Commission launched a public consultation on an EU framework 
for cross-border crisis management in the banking sector. The consultation included the crucial 
                                                           




aspects of early intervention, recovery, and resolution. The results of the consultation were 
made  available  in  March  2010.
2  The Commission announced that it will issue a forma l 
Communication on the issue in the autumn of 2010. 
All of the above is unique and suggests that the Global Crisis 2007 provides an opportunity to 
reflect  upon  the  process  of  international  policy  coordination  and  cooperation  and  the 
conditions that might b e necessary or lead to better outcomes. The reflection   includes 
institutions, modalities, and effectiveness.  
Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to examine the conduct of policies by national 
authorities in an environment of pervasive interdependence and spillover effects. Olson (1965) 
argued that the model of decentralized provision of public goods could be successfully applied 
in a  transnational  context. The first example was the seminal contribution of Olson and 
Zeckhauser (1966) that created  the economic theory of (military) alliances. They characterized 
deterrence as a pure public good among the members of the alliance. The framework can be 
adapted and applied to a wide variety of transnational issues including climate change, energy 
security, international trade, financial stability, and tax competition. Game theory is a useful 
tool for  thinking  systematically about international co-operation. Specifically, it provides a 
framework to identify the obstacles to and opportunit ies for co-operation in the absence of 
external enforcement. 
In the paper, we apply the model of private provision of public goods of Bergstrom, Blume, and 
Varian (1986), to the case of financial stability, following the approach developed in Schinasi 
(2007) and Nieto and Schinasi (2007). In both cases, the benchmark is provided by non -
cooperative Nash equilibrium. A number of propositions are standard .
3 For example, for the 
pure  public  goods  case,  Olson  and  Zeckhauser  (1966)  show  that  the  public  good  is 
underprovided and that a large, wealthy nation bears a disproportionate share of the burden. 
These propositions are qualified for the case of joint products (within the framework of Cornes 
and Sandler, 1984). We will also discuss the possible emergence of co operation. A starting 
benchmark is the case of costless bargaining considered by Coase (1960).
4  
In the paper, game-theoretic results will be presented in simple, intuitive terms. For the  basic 
private provision of public goods model with two agents, the geometrical device of Cornes and 
Sandler (1986) will be used. The device will allow us to contrast non cooperative and 
cooperative solutions. We will also review the insights from the literature on repeated games 
and experimental and historical evidence. The various elements above provide a framework 
that can be used to evaluate institutions, rules ,  and practices of international policy co -
operation. The specific examples we will consider pertain to financial stability. 
                                                           
2 See http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/markt/markt_consultations/library?l=/financial_services/cross-
border_management&vm=detailed&sb=Title 
3 For a rigorous presentation of the most relevant results see Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986). 
Cornes and Sandler (1986, 1996) present  clear and complete textbook coverage and complete 
references to the literature. 
4 The general question of social cooperation, in the presence of pervasive externalities, that characterize 
common resources, has been investigated by 2009 Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostron (1990). 5 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the standard model of 
private provision of public goods and joint product goods. It defines financial stability as a pure 
public good and then later as a public good with both exclusive and non-exclusive benefits or 
what  the  literature  labels  a  joint  product.  This  section  will  describe  and  characterize  the 
challenges of international co-operation and discuss circumstances favoring the emergence of 
effective cooperation. Section III examines and assesses selected actual attempts at European 
cooperation in the financial-stability space. It looks specifically at the control of state aid in the 
context  of  the  single  financial  market;  efforts  to  forge  a  new  architecture  for  prudential 
supervision and regulation; and developments in the area of crisis management (including a 
tool kit to prevent and resolve troubled financial institutions). Section IV concludes.  
 




A.  The Relevance of ‘Economic Theory of Alliances’ 
Given  the  difficulties  involved,  it  is  understandable  that  there  is  not  much  formal 
economic  analysis  of  international    collective  action  problems,  no  less  within  a  European 
context – for example, those pertaining to the financial-stability challenges faced by the EU. 
The ‘economics of alliances’ approach analyzes the nature of ‘equilibrium’ outcomes that can 
arise when members of a group of optimizing decision makers share the benefits of a public 
good (or the costs of its absence) and must decide how to allocate their own scarce resources 
to contribute to its provision. Within this framework, the implications of a variety of decision- 
and policy-making processes can be modeled and analyzed.  
It  is  an  advantage  of  the  ‘economics  of  alliances’  that  one  can  analyze  and  then 
compare  the  characteristics  of  outcomes  consistent  with  non-cooperative  decision-making 
Nash equilibrium.  Non-cooperative equilibrium assumes that decision makers act on their own 
“without any collaboration or communication with any of the others”.
6 However, as we will 
show,  the  framework  may  also  be  used  to  discuss  the  possibility  of  and  constraints  on 
cooperation.  
In  this  paper  we  apply  the  “Economic  Theory  of  Alliances”  to  European  financial 
stability challenges. The main idea is to think about financial stability as a good that provides 
both private and collective benefits to all members of the European Union (or of the euro 
area). Therefore, financial stability may be regarded as a public good (which may provide 
universal or/and exclusive benefits or joint products to different members of the group). The 
economic theory of alliances was designed to apply to situations like the one just described 
above. 
                                                           
5 This section draws on the analysis in Berrigan, Gaspar, and Pearson (2009), Nieto and Schinasi (2007), 
and Schinasi (2007). The authors gratefully acknowledge the earlier contributions of their respective co-
authors and their permission to draw on the work in the respective papers. 
6 John Nash, 1950, Ph.D. Dissertation, page 1. 6 
 
 
B.  Conceptual introduction and some intuition. 
The EU framework for preserving financial stability can be likened to one in which each 
nation independently decides to devote part of its economic resources to provide for the 
stability of its national financial system—through market surveillance and the regulation and 
supervision of financial institutions including bank resolution policies. At the same time, no 
single  over-arching  entity  devotes  resources  to  safeguard  the  stability  of  the  European 
financial system as a whole.  Actual processes for and outcomes from European efforts to 
safeguard financial stability are the result of the amalgamation of decisions made by separate 
but integrated national financial systems.
7 Clearly the simplified description above is only a 
starting point as the EU framework is based on “close coordination of national policies”. We 
postpone discussion of these important aspects of the European framework for later.
 
 
Within this simplified setting, and taking account of some of the differences between 
countries within Europe, three types of countries can be distinguished.  
 
  First,  consider  a  large  country  in  Europe  whose  economic  and  financial  activities 
comprise  a  relatively  large  share  of  European  activities.  In  providing  for  national 
financial stability (or not providing for it) the large country may be providing both 
‘exclusive’ public goods, whose benefits are received by nationals, and ‘pure’ public 
goods, whose benefits are received by a large majority, if not all, European countries. 
For such countries, the provision and maintenance of financial stability can be seen as 
providing joint products: the ‘exclusive’ or national benefits of stability to its own 
citizens  (which  collectively  amounts  to  a  public  good)  as  well  as  the  positive 
externalities  of  stability  conveyed  through  market  integration  and  cross-border 
financial institutions to citizens of other nations whose financial systems are closely 
integrated: the public good from the European perspective. The widespread benefits 
of ‘pure’ public goods can arise, for example, because of the important role of the 
large  country’s  markets,  financial  institutions,  or  market  infrastructures  in  the 
integrated EU market place.  
 
  Second, there are (small) countries in the EU whose financial activities are either small 
relative to EU activity or primarily domestic. In these countries, the resources devoted 
to  safeguarding  national  financial  stability  can  be  seen  as  providing  primarily 
‘exclusive’ (local) benefits to their nationals.  
 
  Third, and by contrast, there are countries in Europe whose size and, therefore, whose 
resources devoted to preserve financial stability are small relative to the potential  
                                                           
7 In this simplified scheme, the “quality” (of the public good) is considered constant and the “quantity” 
varies across countries. 7 
 
externalities that might be conveyed to the EU markets (for example, because of the  
failure of a large cross-border bank whose parent is licensed in the jurisdiction of this 
small country).  
 
Taking these differences as given, the decision making problem faced by policy makers 
in the EU can be viewed as one in which an alliance of a large number of countries (27 in the 
EU or 16 in euro area) independently decide the resources to devote to financial stability in 
their own economies knowing that there is some unquantifiable threat of financial instability 
to Europe as a whole (i.e. contagion), for example, relating to cross-border bank problems. 
They do so in the knowledge, or at least the presumption, that they may both be conveying 
benefits to non-citizens and receiving benefits from the actions of other European countries. 
Because each nation knows this, there are incentives for some to free ride on the benefits 
provided by others (e.g. more prudential supervision) and thereby devote a lower level of 
resources to financial stability than is optimal collectively.  
 
This is a dilemma faced by European policy makers that the models developed below 
make transparent. If each nation makes independent decisions in providing a public-good in 
the form of financial stability, then there is the possibility that each country will devote an 
insufficient amount of resources to safeguarding EU financial stability as a whole and, in some 
countries, perhaps an insufficient level of resources nationally as well. While well-known in 
welfare economics, this conclusion and its implications have rarely been analyzed within this 
financial-stability  context.  Moreover,  the  models  developed  below  carry  several  other 
interesting and, in our view, important implications for the current debate in Europe.  
 
C.  More Formal Analysis   
The logic of a simple model of ‘pure’ public goods, with reference to the EU framework 
to preserve financial stability, can be briefly summarized as follows. Each member of a group 
of countries (the EU) chooses an allocation of resources to produce a ‘pure’ public good that 
conveys benefits to other countries in the group. The benefits can be seen, for example, as the 
management of threats to the stability of the European financial system, such as the resolution 
of a pan-European bank. Each country chooses a resource allocation so as to maximize its own 
welfare  subject  to  two  constraints:  (1)  its  income  constraint  (say,  GDP);  and  (2)  the 
contribution of others to the provision of the public good. While not an exact indicator, a 
country’s GDP relative to total GDP of the alliance of countries (Europe) can be seen as proxy 
for the volume of the country’s financial activities relative to the size of the European financial 
system. One can think of noteworthy exceptions, but they are ignored here for simplicity but 
can be explicitly accommodated in more elaborate models.   
Characterized  as  such,  the  simultaneous  decision-making  process  faced  by  each 
member  of  the  alliance  of  countries  has  many  of  the  features  of  a  non-cooperative 
mathematical game, the solution of which is Nash equilibrium. The Nash solution is equilibrium 8 
 
in the sense that no country has the incentive to alter its allocation of resources subject to the 
observed decisions of all others. Each country decides by setting (national) marginal benefit 
equal to marginal cost, thereby ignoring the effect of the decision on others. 
Keeping  the  exercise  relatively  simple—and  consistent  with  Olson  and  Zeckhauser 
(1966)—requires a number of important simplifying assumptions: (i) all countries share the 
benefits of a single pure public good (as opposed to an imperfect public or club good, with 
some  exclusively  private  benefits);  (ii)  preferences  of  citizens  in  each  country  can  be 
represented in a continuous and twice differentiable utility function; (iii) the cost of producing 
a unit of the common public good is fixed, valued in terms of the ‘numeraire’ private good, and 
is identical in each country; (iv) all decisions are made simultaneously; and (v) the public good 
produced by one country is the same as another (perfect substitutability). 
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i denotes the consumption of private good by individual i and q
i the contribution of 
individual i to the provision of the public good, p denotes the relative price (or cost) of the 
public good (using the private good as numeraire).
9  Most conceptual issues can be clarified by 
using the simple two agent case. For such a case, it is possible to use the budget constraint to 
eliminate the private good from the utility function, and possible to write utility as a function 
of q
1 and q
2. Therefore, in the two agents, two goods case it is possible to present all the main 
results and intuition on the basis of a graphical device (due to Cornes and Sandler, 1986). 
For the two agents case equation [1] may be written as: 
 
The basic idea that allows for the graphical representation derives from noting that: 
                                                           
8 S A full mathematical description of the model and optimization exercise is beyond the scope of the 
paper. A textbook presentation is available from, for example, Cornes and Sandler (1996). 
9 As usual in microeconomics it is assumed that the utility function reflects non-satiation in both goods 
and convexity of preferences. 9 
 
Therefore it is possible to consider a representation in the (q
1,q
2) space. In Figure 1 we start by 
considering agent’s 1 problem.  Let us consider initially the case when  agent  2  does  not 
contribute  to  the  provision  of  the  public  good.  Under  such  conditions  the maximum  that 
country one will be able to consume of the private good equals its income, I, and the maximum 
it can contribute to the provision of financial stability equals I/p. Confronted with the budget 
constraint corresponding to zero provision from the other agent the best country one can 
achieve is point 0 on Figure 1, where indifference curve 0 is tangent to the budget constraint.  
Consider now an alternative situation in which country 2 contributes q
2 to the provision of 
financial stability. In these new circumstances country 1 can now afford to consume more, 
both of the private good and of the public good. Therefore, the budget constraint shifts out. 
Specifically, the maximum amount of the public good attainable is now (I/p)+q
2. The maximum 
amount  of  private  good  that  country  1  can  consume  remains  unchanged  (because  the 
contribution to the provision of financial stability has to be non-negative).  
Since an increase in country 2’s contribution to financial stability leads to a parallel outward 
shift in the budget constraint it is equivalent, for country 1, to an increase in income (with the 
qualification above concerning non-negative contributions to the provision of the public good). 
Therefore,  if  both  goods  are  normal,  an  increase  in  country  2’s  contribution  leads  to  an 
increase in private good consumption by country 1, to a reduction in country 1 contribution to 
the  provision  of  financial  stability  and  to  an  increase  in  the  overall  amount  of  resources 
devoted to financial stability. In other words, country one’s best response or reaction function 
is negatively sloped in the space (q
1, q
2) – see Figure 2. 
The optimization problem facing country 2 is similar. It follows that, in the same conditions, 
country two’s best response or reaction function is also negatively sloped in the space (q
1, q
2). 
When  both  goods  are  normal  goods  an  increase  in  country  1’s  contribution  leads  to  an 
increase in private good consumption by country 2, to a reduction in country 2 contribution to 
the  provision  of  financial  stability  and  to  an  increase  in  the  overall  amount  of  resources 
devoted to financial stability.  
Both countries reduce their contributions to the provision of financial stability in response to 
an increase in the other’s efforts. However, when both goods are normal, the overall amount 
provided increases. It is, therefore, clear that reaction curve of country 1 (N1N1, in Figure 2) is 
more vertical than the reaction curve of country 2 (N2N2, in Figure 2). Under the conditions, a 
single  Nash  equilibrium  exists  and  it  is  stable  under  simple  adjustment  mechanisms  (see 
Bergstrom, Blume and Varian, 1986 or Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) 
The most relevant implications of the model are stated as Propositions C1-to-C5:
 10 
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  C1:  The  Nash  equilibrium  is  inefficient.  As  is  well  known  in  other  contexts,  the 
(decentralized,  non-cooperative)  Nash-equilibrium  level  of  resources  devoted  to 
financial stability would be suboptimal relative to the Pareto-optimal allocation.  
 
No country considers the costs and benefits of its resource-allocation decisions in producing 
the pure public good for other European countries. Consequently, a sub-optimal level of the 
public good will be provided by a decentralized process compared to a coordinated one in 
which even only some of the positive externalities (benefits) from collective action can be 
internalized  and  distributed  to  all  European  countries.  All  of  the  shaded  area  in  Figure  2 
identifies feasible contributions to the provision of financial stability that lead to increases in 
the welfare of both countries.  
 
  C2:  Exploitation  of  the  large  by  the  small:  Because  of  the  model’s  decentralized 
decision-making process, some countries (smaller ones) may find it optimal to free-
ride on the efforts of others (as implied by perfect substitutability in the provision of 
the public good). This would be reflected in the country distribution of the supply of 
the  public  good.    More  specifically,  the  optimal  allocation  of  the  burden  of 
safeguarding financial stability (for example, the sharing of the costs of resolving a 
cross-border banking problem) falls disproportionately on the larger (higher income) 
countries—in the sense that they provide a share of the public good that exceeds their 
GDP share in the group of countries. That is, in the Nash equilibrium, a large country’s 
share in providing the group’s total public good will exceed its GDP share in the Union. 
 
  C3:  Reaction  functions  (demand  functions  for  the  public  good):  In  the  Nash 
equilibrium, member countries’ propensities to provide the public good (that is, their 
policy reactions to a threat to their financial stability) will depend on four factors: 
country-specific income, the relative cost of producing financial stability, the aggregate 
amount of resources devoted to financial stability by other member countries, and the 
commonly  perceived  threat  of  financial  instability.  If  all  factors  were  in  fact 
measurable, these derived policy reaction functions would be estimable. 
 
  C4:  cooperation  has  the  potential  to  improve  on  decentralized  equilibrium:  as  a 
corollary to C1, in case the players are able to coordinate effectively they have the 
opportunity to improve on the decentralized equilibrium.  
 
It  is  important  to  recognize  that  C4  is  a  simple  corollary  of  C1.  If  there  are  feasible 
opportunities to improve the situation of both countries then it logically follows that it is 
feasible to improve on the decentralized equilibrium through co-operation. In Figure 2 we 
identify the relevant geometric region by CC (for Coase). We will comment further on this 
below (see sub-section 2.D.). 
 
  C5: enlargement of the alliance is beneficial in the case of pure public goods: The 
addition  of  new  member  countries  (e.g.,  EU  enlargement)  would  imply  additional 11 
 
marginal benefits to the group as a whole (more contributors) without a diminution in 
the benefits for existing member countries to the extent that public goods are non-
excludable and non-rival (as the model assumes) and the threat to financial stability is 
not increased.
 11  
 
These implications are conditional on the assumptions made and will change if some 
of the assumptions of the model are relaxed or altered. For example, if one allows for country 
differences  in  the marginal  cost of  producing  the pure  public  good, optimal  decentralized 
decision making would imply that the more efficient countries would take on a larger share of 
the EU wide costs regardless of their size. Thus, by relaxing this assumption, a country with a 
comparative advantage in providing, for example, efficient and relatively reliable clearing and 
settlement services might end up devoting a greater amount of resources to producing this 
particular good to the benefit of all of Europeans.  
 
D.  Coase Equilibria as the More Desirable Outcomes (a first pass) 
It is possible to improve on the de-centralized Nash equilibrium through collective 
action or  bilateral  (or multilateral)  negotiation.  For  example, starting  from  point  N,  if,  for 
example, country 1 would increase its contribution, it  would be possible for country 2 to 
increase its contribution so as to ensure that 1 would move along  its indifference curve, while 
country 2 would improve its welfare. The entire shaded area in Figure 1 includes pairs of 
contributions that are Pareto superior to the Nash equilibrium.  
In  1960,  Ronald  Coase  stated  a  tautology  with  far-reaching  implications  for  the 
solution to collective action problems. This tautology became known as the Coase Theorem. It 
provides a device for examining private solutions to collective action problems. The idea is that 
in  an  environment  with  perfect  information  and  costless  bargaining,  a  mutually  beneficial 
agreement will be reached whenever there is one.
12 
Coase’s theorem was developed to apply to bargaining situations in private markets 
among private agents in which there are costs and benefits associated with externalities or 
spillovers. The classic example is the case of straying cattle that damages crops on neighboring 
land.  However,  Coase’s  theorem  appears  to  be  equally  applicable  to  bargaining  situations 
involving groups of countries (such as the EU) when national-government decisions pertaining 
to  economic,  social,  cultural,  and  political  policies  are  associated  with  externalities  or 
spillovers.  
In principle, it seems rational and reasonable to think that the fundamental intuition 
from the Coase Theorem can apply in Europe to a very broad range of policy decisions (Gaspar, 
2006 formulated this question). In such cases, spillover effects can be internalized through 
                                                           
11 This result follows from the pure public good formulation and the implicit assumption that risk is 
invariant to the number of countries. If one introduces idiosyncratic risk and the risk of contagion the 
result would not follow. 
12 Coase (1960) is the original reference. See Bowles (2004, pages 221-232) and Shavell (2004, page 84). 12 
 
negotiation and collective action, which in turn can lead to  more  efficient outcomes. The 
plausibility of more efficient outcomes increases once it is acknowledged that the number of 
decision makers is limited and that by meeting repeatedly – within the context of various EU 
organizations, Committees, and Working Groups – decision making and outcomes can benefit 
from ample opportunities to communicate, share information and analyses, and find mutually 
advantageous  agreements.  Given  the  existing  framework,  it  is  reasonable  to  observe  that 
Europe today is far from a situation in which nations and their decision makers  act in isolation 
on  their  own  “without  any  collaboration  or  communication  with  any  of  the  others”.
13  By 
definition,  when  opportunities  for  mutually  beneficial  agreements  have  been  exhausted  a 
Pareto optimal solution has been reached. 
The Coase Theorem predicts an outcome along the CC line in the northeast part of 
Figure 2, in the portion bounded by the two indifference curves corresponding to the Nash 
equilibrium. In the context of EU financial regulation and supervision, the expression "close 
cooperation among the competent national authorities" may be interpreted as the challenge 
of managing the transition from a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium to an efficient collective 
action outcome along the CC line. In some areas of European integration and cooperation it is 
reasonable to argue that such a transition has already been successfully completed.  
As  will  be  discussed  further  later,  although  potentially  useful  for  examining  EU 
processes for coordination and cooperation, the Coase Theorem has important limitations. In a 
nutshell,  the  theorem  assumes  costless  bargaining.  Specifically,  the  theorem  implies  the 
absence of transactions' costs and the existence of perfect and symmetric information. Some 
examples of how departures from these assumptions affect outcomes will be examined in the 
remainder of the paper. One point is immediately clear from the observation of Figure 2, 
however: there are multiple efficient allocations (meeting the Pareto criterion and individual 
rationality). Any effective solution to the negotiation process or collective action problem must 
be able to focus on one single solution.  Such an outcome is not necessarily easy because 
country 1 welfare improves and country 2 welfare declines as the solution moves from south-
east to north-west in Figure 2. 
As already discussed, it seems that in the European Union conditions are in place to 
benefit from an application of Coasian thinking to collective decision making. First, the number 
of players involved is limited. Second, the game is repeated as the financial stability framework 
is applied and reformed over time. Third, "close cooperation" takes place in the context of a 
number  of  committees  and  working  groups  where  responsible  policy-makers  and  experts 
identify the relevant issues and work to find acceptable solutions. Fourth, the members of 
these groups are well aware of the problems identified in the relevant literatures (and more).  
In  the  remaining  sub-sections  of  section  2,  the  paper  discusses  extensions  and 
interprets the basic model in order to build a conceptual framework to assess institutional 
change in the EU financial system and its ability to  safeguard financial stability. The next sub-
section introduces the case of ‘exclusive’ or ‘impure’ public goods. In the literature, these 
cases are known as joint products cases for reasons that will  be explained below. 
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E.  A more complicated case: the joint products model. 
Countries in Europe provide financial-stability public goods whose benefits are also 
country-specific and convey exclusively to economic agents residing within the country. For 
example, countries in Europe have country-specific deposit insurance schemes that protect 
domestic  depositors  in  segments  of  the  national  banking  system  that  are  exclusive  retail, 
domestic  financial  institutions  (such  as,  for  example,  the  Sparkassen  in  Germany).  More 
generally, the geographical distribution of banks' customers – with proximity playing a very 
important role – implies that some aspects of financial stability will accrue in accordance with 
well-defined territorial patterns. 
By contrast, there are elements of the EU financial safety net that require domestic 
public expenditures and public maintenance but that nevertheless convey public good benefits 
across a large part, and in some cases the whole, of the European financial landscape. For 
example, there are costs associated with the European framework of prudential regulation and 
with operating financial infrastructures in European countries – such as large-value payments 
systems. 
Once  the  possibility  of  ‘exclusive’  or  ‘impure’  public  goods  is  acknowledged  and 
accounted for, the nature of the decision-making process within a country and among a group 
of countries changes – as do the country and potential collective benefits. In particular, while 
the set up of the model is the same as before, the public good conveys two types of joint 
benefits:  ‘exclusive’  public-good  benefits  that  convey  only  to  the  citizens  of  that  specific 
country, and ‘fully shared’ public-good benefits to all other members of the group of countries 
(i.e. non contagion or absence of European systemic crisis)
14. A key parameter in this model is 
the share of ‘exclusive’ benefits to the producing country relative to total benefits to all of 
Europe. 
With the introduction of ‘exclusive’ benefits (i.e., ‘impure’ public goods), Nash reaction 
functions  can  become  nonlinear  and  upward  sloping  –  due  in  part  to  the  possibility  of 
complementarities between the goods provided by different agents (countries). This implies 
that there could be a multiplicity of Nash equilibriums even though all goods are ‘normal’ 
goods (in the sense that demand rises/falls with income).
15 This contrasts with the results 
reported in sub-section C: for the case of pure public goods if both goods are normal there is a 
unique Nash equilibrium. 
The implications of this more complicated model can be summarized as follows.  
                                                           
14 Clearly, the distinction of only national and European aspects of public goods provision is a simplifying 
assumption. For example, some important aspects of deposit-taking and credit provision will be 
associated with very pronounced concentrations at the sub-national (regional) level. On the other side, 
some international bank conglomerates have a truly global reach. However, the generalization to a 
multi-layer case is straightforward.  
15 A full mathematical description of the model and optimization exercise is beyond the scope of the 
paper. A textbook presentation is available from, for example, Cornes and Sandler (1996). 
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  E1: Nash equilibrium is inefficient: As in the ‘pure’ public good model, other countries’ 
welfare are unaccounted for in each country’s decisions and so the resulting Nash 
equilibrium is still sub-optimal compared to one in which the decision making process 
internalizes  spillover effects.  
 
  E2: Exploitation is mitigated (relative to the case of pure public goods): The greater 
are the exclusive benefits to a particular country relative to total benefits, the lower 
will  be  the  extent  to  which  the  cost  of  providing  shared  benefits  will  fall 
disproportionately on larger countries.  
 
This is because as exclusive benefits take a greater share of total benefits (and as 
national financial stability becomes the exclusive benefit), smaller countries may capture fewer 
shared benefits and devote more of their resources to produce exclusive public goods. In other 
words, when there are country-specific benefits, small countries have a greater incentive to 
produce the public good (financial stability). As the exclusive benefits relative share to total 
benefits  approaches one, market  solutions  and  the  formation of  ‘clubs’ or  ‘coalitions’  are 
capable of yielding solutions that achieve more efficient equilibrium outcomes (for example, 
consider the special coalitions between the Nordic and the Benelux countries to safeguard 
financial  stability).  This occurs  because when  there  are  exclusive country-specific  benefits, 
more of the benefits of a public good are received by the country producing it. Accordingly, 
equilibrium outcomes are associated with a greater association between a country’s benefits 
received and costs incurred, which is welfare-improving for all country members concerned.
16 
 
  E3:  Demand  functions:  the  pure  public  goods  model  can  be  nested  into  the  joint 
products model. The determinants of demand functions in the latter case are as in the 
former. However, in the standard pure public goods model, income enters the model 
in the same way as spill-ins.
17 In the case of joint products, the demand for the public 
good is influenced in two ways by the increase in other countries’ effort devote to the 
provision of the good: indirectly through full income and directly through spill-ins. 
 
  E4: Reaction functions: In the pure public goods set-up, if both the private and public 
good are normal goods the slope of the reaction function will be negative. However, in 
the joint products case the reaction curves can be positively sloped even when all 
goods are normal. This requires that the pure and impure public goods are strong 
complements.  
                                                           
16 Empirical evidence suggests that the public-good benefits of deposit insurance are mainly local. This 
outcome is consistent with this proposition, namely that because the benefits are local or exclusive, 
deposit insurance is provided locally by national authorities. Moreover, there would appear to be few 
incentives  for  a  transnational  scheme  for  deposit  insurance,  although  this  need  not  exclude  the 
possibility and the existence of benefits of harmonization across jurisdictions. 
In the literature on the economic theory of alliances, the joint products model was developed because 
of an empirical challenge. With available data up to 1964, the burden-sharing pattern across NATO 
countries seemed in line with the exploitation hypothesis (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966). However, in the 
late 1960s and 1970s the hypothesis no longer seemed to apply (see Sandler and Hartley, 1995) for a 
review and complete references to the relevant literature.   
17 Full income aggregates income with the value of spillins from other countries’ provision of the public 
good. The concept is due to Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986). 15 
 
 
  E5:  Possibility  of  Multiple  Equilibria:  In  cases  in  which  the  reaction  functions  are 
positively  sloped  (and  non-linear),  there  may  be  multiple  equilibria  (that  may  be 
ranked in accordance with the Pareto criterion) 
18.  
 
  E6: Endogenous alliance size (the effects of thinning): joint products with different 
degrees of rivalry in consumption lead to the possibility of benefits associated with the 
partially rival goods. In such cases, new members will be admitted only as long as the 
marginal benefits from cost sharing exceed the marginal costs from dilution of the 
benefits from (partially) rival goods (thinning). 
 
  The  literature  on  the  economics  of  alliances  suggests  that  the  existence  of  joint 
products could in reality make it easier to agree on collective action and coalition forming than 
the  case  of  the  pure  goods  model.  As  Sandler  and  Sargent  (1995)  demonstrated,  a  joint-
products’ view may result in a coordination game where one of the Nash equilibrium would 
have all countries contributing to the collective action. If the ‘pure’ public-good benefits are a 
sufficient share of total benefits, then contributing to the activity may even be a dominant 
strategy. That is, if coordination allows countries to take advantage of country-specific benefits 
as  well  as  excludable  public  benefits,  then the  payoff  pattern may  be more  conducive  to 
encouraging all countries to make contributions to the ‘fully shared’ public-good. Thus, the mix 
of joint products and their public-ness can influence how coalitions and alliances are formed. 
 
F.  Coase’s perspective: a fuller discussion. 
 
The very simplified presentation and discussion of the Coase Theorem  in sub-section D. fails to 
do justice to the relevance of Coase’s insights for the problem at hand. In 1991, Coase was 
awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics. According to Oliver Williamson (2008), the introduction 
of contracts as the driving force underlying  economic transactions and outcomes  was the 
essence of Coase’s contribution from his seminal papers (Coase, 1937, 1946, 1960). Prior to 
Coase’s  analyses,  economics  had  concentrated  primarily  on  the  science  of  choice.  Coase 
advocated the need to complement this traditional perspective with an analysis of contracts, 
thereby bringing together law, economics, and organization theory.  
As does most of the economics literature, sub-section D above focuses on the Coase Theorem 
– that is, on cases in which there are zero bargaining (or transaction) costs. The argument 
covers only a very small part of Coase’s contribution confined to sections III and IV of the 1960 
paper. The case of zero transactions costs was meant by Coase  to be  an introduction to the 
much more relevant case of non-negligible transaction costs (see Coase’s Nobel Lecture – 
                                                           
18 For a proof of this implication of product complementarity of pure and exclusive goods in the joint 
product model see Cornes and Sandler (1986) pp. 118-21, following Cornes and Sandler (1984). 16 
 
Coase, 1991). The Coase Theorem is best regarded as an extreme benchmark and starting 
point for further analysis. In the extreme case, Coase (1960) showed that the details of liability 
for  damages  would  not  affect  efficiency  in  resource  allocation.  Costless  bargaining  in 
competitive environments would be sufficient to eliminate inefficiencies.  
A world of zero transactions costs is obviously very far from experience. To make the point 
clear it suffices to quote (again) from Coase (1988): “Another consequence of zero transaction 
costs, not usually noticed, is that when there are no costs of making transactions, it costs 
nothing to speed them up, so that eternity can be experienced in a split second.” The remark 
suggests the importance of looking at how long run interactions may facilitate cooperation. 
This is a specific way of identifying institutions that lead to more efficient outcomes. The 
example in sub-section C of this paper suggests that this is not easy. In Figure 2, all feasible 
allocations that improve on the Nash equilibrium violate the reasonable constraint that each 
decision  maker’s  action  be  a  best  response  to  the  other’s  action.  In  other  words,  for  all 
allocations in the gray area, each country has an incentive to defect (if it can get away with it). 
Clearly, consideration of the future may eliminate (or limit) defection. In game theory, a model 
of repeated games is the simplest set up that allows for the endogenous modeling of strategic 
interactions over time. Within repeated games, the most intuitive and technically easiest case 
is that of low or no discounting (so that future matters the most).  
The intuition of repeated games is well captured in the so-called “folk theorem.”
19 The main 
point  is  that  when  agents  are  sufficiently  patient  there  are  many  outcomes  that  can  be 
obtained  as  equilibria.  More  specifically,  for  patient  individuals  (with  discount  factors 
sufficiently close to one), every payoff that is feasible and individually rational can be sustained 
as an equilibrium. The intuition is simple: For patient decision makers, any finite gain from a 
short term deviation from the equilibrium will eventually be offset by a reduction in the payoff 
into the indefinite future. It follows that any equilibrium that respects the individual rationality 
constraint will ensure compliance of a deviating decision maker  through the threat of pushing 
him to that lower bound in every subsequent period.  
One problem with the “folk theorem” is that it requires unrelenting punishment of deviating 
behavior even when it is very costly for the punisher. Punishment may not be an equilibrium 
action for the punisher when the relevant time comes. In game theory, such strategies are said 
not to be “sub-game perfect”.  
James Friedman (1971) derived a result concerning sub-game perfect equilibria for repeated 
games with discounting. He showed that any outcome that is strictly superior (in the sense of 
the Pareto criterion) to a static Nash equilibrium can be sustained by a sub-game perfect 
equilibrium when the discount factor is sufficiently close to one. Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) 
extended this result by showing that in the case of two players – or, for any (finite) number of 
players when an additional “full dimensionality” condition holds – “any individually rational 
payoff vector of a one-shot game of complete information can arise in a perfect equilibrium of 
the infinitely repeated game, if players are sufficiently patient.” The Friedman result shows 
                                                           
19  See  Fudenberg  and  Tirole  (1991)  and  Fudenberg  and  Levine  (2009)  for  rigorous  presentation, 
interpretation and references to the literature. 17 
 
that all points in the gray lens (in Figure 2) can be supported as sub-game perfect equilibria of 
a repeated game when agents are sufficiently patient. 
Fudenberg and Levine (1991) derived a very general set of results for the case of private 
information when there is no discounting. More recently, Fudenberg and Levine (2007) proved 
that the results for games with public monitoring can, under well specified conditions, be 
approximated for games with private monitoring and communication. 
The “folk theorem” and its extensions show that when agents are sufficiently patient, there 
are many allocations that can be obtained as Nash equilibria, including efficient allocations. In 
Figure 2, in the one-shot game, all allocations inside the gray lens are socially feasible and 
Pareto superior to the Nash equilibrium. According to Friedman (1971), they can be supported 
in Nash equilibrium, for the repeated game for a discount factor sufficiently close to one. The 
good  news  is that  efficient  outcomes (co-operative)  can  be supported  in equilibrium.  The 
importance of this point cannot be over-estimated. It opens an avenue to use the theory of 
repeated games to explain endogenously how players can be motivated to depart from their 
short run (selfish) interests in the absence of external enforcement. This kind of endogenous 
mechanism  can  be  used  to  explain  the  emergence  of  trust  and  cooperation  in  society.  A 
fascinating example is provided by North and Weingast (1989) who look at the transformation 
of economic institutions in England in the wake of the Glorious Revolution.
20 
However,  since  many  allocations  can  be  supported  as  equilibria ,  game  theory  has  low 
predictive power.  That is, any socially feasible allocation that is individually rational can be 
obtained as equilibrium.  
Problems  associated with multiple solutions  (equilibria)  have  been  known and  explicitly 
recognized for  a  long  time  (at  least  since  Edgeworth’s  Mathematical  Psychics  of  1881). 
Edgeworth  identified  the  locus  of  possible  contracts  between  two  parties  as  the  set  of 
allocations that cannot be disturbed by the voluntary consent of both parties and ensure to 
each  greater  utility  than  in  the  absence  of  a  settlement.  Edgeworth  stresses  the  evils  of 
indeterminate contracts, deadlock, and the irreducible opposition of interests. Nevertheless, 
he goes on to argue that it is in the best interest of both parties to agree on some contract and 
that we would expect them to be able to do so. In contrast, Samuelson (1947) writes: “… from 
any point off the contract curve there is a movement towards it which would be beneficial to 
both individuals. This is not the same thing as to say, with Edgeworth, that exchanges will in 
fact  necessarily  cease  somewhere  on  the  contract  curve;  for  in  many  types  of  bilateral 
monopoly a final equilibrium may be reached off the contract curve.” Samuelson is clearly 
right and in line with the findings from the “folk theorem” and extensions. 
In this respect, Coase (1988) makes a crucial remark: “Samuelson asserts as “an empirical 
statement of fact” that people, in the situation analyzed by Edgeworth, will not necessarily end 
up somewhere on the contract curve. This is no doubt correct, but a fact even more significant 
is that normally we would expect them to end up there.”  
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Is Coase’s optimism warranted? It does seem to be in line with experimental evidence (see, for 
example, Ledyard, 1995, Roth, 1995 and Dal Bó, 2005).  Dal Bó introduces the memorable 
notion of “the shadow of the future”: “when there is always a future, as in infinitely repeated 
games, the credible threat of retaliation casts “the shadow of the future” in every decision and 
can overcome opportunistic behavior and support cooperation, thereby solving the tension 
between  private  incentives  and  the  common  good.”  Nevertheless,  according  to  the 
experiments performed by Dal Bó, cooperation increased in some cases in which cooperation 
was  a  possible  equilibrium  action  but  not  in  others.  More  explicitly,  learning  supports 
cooperation  in  some  cases  but  not  in  others.  The  identification  of  conditions  favoring 
cooperative outcomes is a priority area for future theoretical and empirical research. In any 
case the results show that the identification of cooperation as a possible equilibrium is not 
sufficient for the emergence of cooperation. The experimental literature has produced few 
robust and general results. Dal Bó’s finding that the prospect of future interaction improves 
cooperation is a key exception. In addition, Ledyard (1995) finds that marginal payoffs and 
communication have a systematic effect on individuals’ ability to cooperate. These findings are 
in line with the results from the models presented in sub-sections C and E above.  
Another relevant strand of research is associated with Elinor Ostrom. She looked at real-world 
cases of decentralized, voluntary solutions to common property resource management (e.g. 
water resources and fisheries). Her seminal work is collected in Ostrom (1990). She documents 
a number of successful cases in which individuals have been able to tackle the challenge of 
common property resource management. Ostrom’s research identifies conditions favoring the 
emergence  of  effective  collective  action  mechanisms  and  the  characteristics  of  enduring 
arrangements. Her findings may be summarized (in simplified form) as follows: 
The emergence of successful and enduring solution to collective problems is more likely when: 
1.  The number of actors involved is limited. 
2.  There are players with assets or abilities that allow them to play a leadership role. 
3.  The number of participants needed to ensure the viability of an agreement is small. 
4.  Players have long horizons (low discount rate). 
5.  Players have similar interests (complementary in action). 
6.  Opportunities exist for easy ex ante communication and ex post monitoring. 
7.  Graduated sanctions for non-compliance are in place. 
8.  There are effective conflict resolution mechanisms.  
As stressed above, transactions cost are pervasive. Coase’s research programme envisaged 
investigating  the  organization  of  economic  exchange  and  activity  in  the  presence  of 
transaction costs. But what are transaction costs? Carl Dahlman (1979) described them as 19 
 
“search  and  information  costs,  bargaining  and  decision  costs,  policing  and  enforcement 
costs,” and was quoted with approval by Coase (1988). 
Research  on  transaction  costs  and  on  the  possibility  of  the  emergence  of  decentralized 
solutions  to  collective  action  problems  is  very  active  today.  The  issue  is  far  from  closed. 
Nevertheless, the game theoretic models, the experimental evidence, and the case studies 
reviewed in this section provide a set of principles that can be used in the examination of 
particular cases. In our reading of the lessons from theory, experimental evidence and case 
studies are remarkably consistent. 
In section III we apply these lessons to examine the way forward for financial supervision and 
regulation in the European Union. 
 
 




In the EU, financial market integration is part of the Single Market process and is, thereby, 
actively promoted by institutions such as the European Commission and the European Central 
Bank. Financial integration unambiguously favors competition, liquidity, and cost minimization. 
It  also  expands  opportunities  for  profitable  investments  and  for  risk  spreading  and  risk 
diversification.  Moreover,  it  allows  economic  entities  to  smooth  consumption  over  time, 
thereby expanding the opportunity set and increasing welfare (see, for example, Kalemli-Ozcan 
and Sørensen, 2008 and Jappelli and Pagano, 2010).  
By  contrast,  the  impact  of  European  financial  integration  on  the  ability  to  maintain 
financial stability is ambiguous. On the one hand, a large and integrated market allows, as 
mentioned above, for additional scope for risk spreading and risk diversification. On the other 
hand,  integration  increases  inter-connections  across  borders.  Therefore,  it  increases  the 
potential for spillover effects, especially when extreme events occur, and creates potentially 
destabilizing opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.   
The framework for EU cross-border banking regulation and supervision derives from 
banking directives, first adopted in the context of the Single Market Programme of 1985-92.
 It 
is comprised of four main elements: EU-wide rules (implying a degree of harmonization across 
member  states),  mutual  recognition  of  national  rules,  enforcement  of  all  rules  based  on 
national  responsibility  (in  line  with  home-country  control),  and  close  cooperation  among 
competent authorities at both EU and national levels. Application of the framework varies, 
depending on the legal structure of the bank (i.e., whether it is a branch or subsidiary) and its 
business model, in particular, the extent to which it engages in cross-border business and has 
cross-border exposures. As pointed out in section 2, the principle of close cooperation among 
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the competent authorities reflects the aim of reaching a cooperative solution. It is, therefore, 
worthwhile to examine how cooperation works. 
There are presently less than 50 EU cross-border banking groups – from a total of 
more than 8,500 banks – with significant holdings of cross-border assets and liabilities. All 
other banking institutions have primarily national businesses and exposures. Accordingly, the 
overwhelming  majority  of  banking  institutions,  in  principle,  can  be  well  regulated  and 
supervised within the decentralized EU framework because it takes advantage of the local 
knowledge and expertise of local supervision.
22 By contrast, supervision of the cross-border 
exposures of the larger banking groups would seem to require additional efforts to ensure that 
relevant spillover effects are effectively internalized. The issue is central for safeguarding EU 
financial stability as cross-border banks are important in the EU banking sector (e.g. cross 
border banks hold more than 68% of total assets of the EU banking sector). 
Thus,  except  for  the  50  or  so  cross-border  banks,  current  EU  decentralized 
arrangements for banking regulation and supervision would seem to be appropriate in the 
sense that the territorial scope and nature of bank activities more-or-less matches national 
responsibilities for regulation and supervision.  
In contrast, cross-border banks have restructured their organizations to profit from the 
integrated  single  market  for  financial  services.  Many  have  centralized  key  functions 
irrespective of their legal structure (branch-based or subsidiary-based). As business models 
and internal organizational structures change, the supervision of individual legal entities within 
a banking group becomes increasingly less relevant. At the same time, the risk of duplication of 
reporting and inconsistent supervisory requirements increases. The case of cross-border banks 
illustrates what in the de Larosière Report has been identified as the lack of a consistent and 
harmonized  set  of  core  rules.  According  to  the  Report,  national  specificities  should  be 
identified and eventually eliminated when their removal would: (i) improve the functioning of 
the single market; (ii) avoid distortions of competition or regulatory arbitrage; (iii) improve the 
efficiency of cross-border financial activity in the EU. Implicit in the foregoing is the necessity 
to co-operate in crisis management. 
In the context of EU regulation and supervision, the expression "close cooperation 
among the competent national authorities" may be interpreted as the challenge of managing 
the transition from a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium (point N in the graph) to an efficient 
Coasian collective-action outcome that is Pareto optimal (along the CC line in the graph). The 
discussion above suggests that in some dimensions the supervisory and regulatory framework 
                                                           
22 We do not mean to imply that all is well regarding supervisory frameworks and practices in individual 
EU member states. Garcia, Lastra, and Nieto (2009) survey and analyze EU member states’ supervisory 
frameworks and practices and find that they diverge widely among EU members. They find (on pp. 244-
45) that not all supervisors have the tools necessary to induce effective remedial action for banks whose 
capital decline below minimum regulatory levels or who engage in excessive risk taking. In particular, 
they  find  that  "not  all  supervisors  can  levy  fines,  remove  errant  managers,  impose  stricter  capital 
requirements, require a remedial plan, appoint a special inspector, impose condition on the chartered 
bank,  or  restrict  business  activities  including  the  prohibition  of  any  capital  expenditure.  Not  all 
supervisors  can  curtail  owners’  voting  rights,  initiatee  reorganization  or  winding-up  procedures,  or 
appoint a conservator to run it.” Supervisory powers to prevent asset transfers also varies widely across 
EU member states.  21 
 
in the EU already approximates such a situation. At the same time, current arrangements do 
not seem sufficient for banking groups with substantial cross-border activities.  
European  financial  integration  is  an  evolving  reality.  Europe’s  financial  landscape, 
before the crisis, was becoming, gradually (but rapidly) more integrated. The pace of change 
appeared to have stepped up with the creation of the euro area. The introduction of the single 
currency  has  had  very  pronounced  (and  measurable)  effects  on  cross-border  activities, 
especially in money markets and in bond markets
23. Jappelli and Pagano (2010) affirm that 
money and government bond markets  became fully integrated almost immediately with the 
introduction of the euro
24. 
In general terms, the remarks above point to a fundamental tension between a 
financial  regulatory  and  supervisory  architecture  based  on  the  exercise  of  national 
responsibilities founded on home-country control, and mutual recognition, on the one hand, 
and the active promotion of European financial integration effectively encouraging private 
organizations to ignore national borders, on the other hand.
25 The Global Crisis brought the 
relevant issues into sharp focus. The most integrated financial markets  – money markets and 
bond markets – were also the most affected by the crisis. Interbank money markets have been 
repeatedly  affected  by  a  heightened  perception  of  counter-party  risk.  Moreover,  in  the 
autumn of 2008, emergency measures taken to limit financial turmoil risked segmenting the 
Single Market along national lines. 
In the next three sub-sections we will examine from the perspective of game theory  
the progress in EU cross-border cooperation in three important financial-stability areas: (1) 
state aid to financial organizations; (2)  cross-border financial supervision and regulation; and, 
(3) crisis management, bank re-structuring, and orderly crisis resolution.  
 
A.  The European Single Financial Market and State Aid. 
 
The Single Market provides common economic and financial benefits to citizens of all 
Member States. In the language of section 2, the Single Market is a European public good. It 
needs  protection  against  the  possibility  of  encroachment  or  free-riding  from  individual 
countries. The European Union Treaty includes such safeguards in the form of a competition 
policy and state aid rules. Competition policy is an exclusive competence of the Union;  and, 
together  with state aid rules, it  aims to create and maintain a level playing field in the single 
                                                           
23 See Annual Financial Integration Reports released by the European Commission and by the ECB. 
24  The turmoil in sovereign debt markets that started in the autumn of 2009 and reached an acute stage 
in May 2010 is particularly relevant for financial stability given the cross-border relevance of 
government bonds. Clearly there are important policy spillovers in this area. Nevertheless we do not 
discuss the issue in the paper. In the European Union relevant issues pertaining to euro area governance 
are under discussion by a high-level task force, chaired by van Rompuy, President of the European 
Council, The task force will complete its work in early autumn 2010. 
25  See, for example, Padoa -Schioppa, 2004, for an early formulation of the problem and extensive 
references. 22 
 
internal market. State aid rules, in particular, constrain the ability of governments to distort 
the functioning of the single market. The core provisions on state aid rules are in articles 107-
109 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
26. Article 107 establishes that, in 
general, state aid is contrary to the common market, and it lists a number of exceptions to the 
rule.   Paragraph 3, of article  107 allows  the Council to decide, by qualified majority, on a 
proposal from the European Commission , on further exceptions. Article  108, paragraph 2, 
allows the Council to decide by unanimity (on application from a Member State) that aid that 
the  latter  granted  or  intends  to  grant  is  compatible  with  the  common  market.  More 
importantly  article  108,  paragraph  3 ,  imposes  the  obligation  to  notify  the  European 
Commission. Failure to notify render s aid incompatible with the common market. National 
courts and authorities are then obligated to recover the aid granted.  
The Global Crisis created strains on the Single Market that originated in the actions of 
Member States’ competent authorities through two different channels: (1) actions to prevent 
a financial meltdown,- and (2) actions associated with mitigating the impact of the crisis on the 
vulnerability of some manufacturing firms.  This paper focuses exclusively on the  financial 
sector. 
In  the  late  summer  and  autumn  of  2008,  some  financial  institutions  faced  the 
possibility of massive withdrawals of deposits and other sources of funding. The borderline 
between  illiquidity  and  insolvency  became  blurred.  Governments  stepped  in  to  guarantee 
deposits and other bank liabilities and also to foster re-capitalization
27. The amounts approved 
for capital injections, guarantees on bank liabilities, relief of impaired assets, and liquidity and 
bank funding support are enormous. They represent 43.6 per cent of the GDP in the European 
Union and 36.5 per cent in the euro area. Amounts effectively granted are smaller but still 
sizable at, respectively, 11.8 and 11.1 per cent. Government support was deemed as necessary 
to avert  a financial meltdown  and the associated  and potentially  dire economic and social 
consequences. 
At the same time, there was the clear and present danger of  spillover effects among 
Member States and disruptions to the Single Market. A good example is the  unilateral 
broadening of deposit insurance   by Ireland in September 2008. The  unilateral reform of 
Ireland’s deposit insurance scheme, as originally designed, could have led to a massive re-
location of deposits from other EU countries to Ireland. In the heat of the moment, other 
Member States, starting with the UK, had little alternative except to follow. The immediate 
need for collective action became pressing.  
Article 107, Paragraph 3, b allows state aid "to remedy a serious disturbance in the 
economy of a Member State". In the event, it permitted the flexibility needed to respond to 
the  Global  Crisis.  The  Commission  reacted  very  rapidly  to  notifications  frequently  during 
weekends and even within 24 hours. In the case of Ireland, the European Commission reacted 
swiftly and the ECOFIN Council agreed to raise the minimum amount of deposit guaranteed. In 
our view, this is a clear example of a coincidence of a strong crisis-management imperative, 
the  need  for  decisive  action  at  the  national  level,  and  the  possibility  of  far-reaching  and 
                                                           
26 Corresponding to articles 87-89 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. 
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evident spillover effects for other EU Member States financial systems. It is a situation that 
called for crisis-management coordination and collective action. 
More generally, the Commission, through a series of Communications (see Table 1) 
provided a framework for proper use of government support in the context of the Global 
Crisis. It defined three main criteria indicating that state aid should: (1) be well-targeted; (2) be 
proportional to the goal pursued; and (3) minimize spillovers and distortions.  
In the framework of the European Union, aid schemes are reviewed every six months 
to  avoid  that  aid  measures  last  longer  than  necessary.  In  other  words,  the  Commission's 
guidelines  aim  to  ensure  that  state  aid  to  financial  institutions  does  not  give  rise  to 
disproportionate distortions to competition and adheres to the principle of a level playing 
field.  Relevant aid measures are clearly defined, have limited duration and a complete list is 
available for public scrutiny. 
One aspect of the process of review of state aid by the European Commission which 
was widely reported relates to the examination and approval of restructuring plans. The main 
considerations are to ensure that the organization receiving aid returns to viability without the 
need  for  continued  state  support  and  that  competition  in  the  relevant  markets  is  not 
permanently distorted. Cases examined included RBS, Lloyds, ING, KBC, LLBC and Dexia. In 
many cases restructuring involved divesting in relevant business areas to make sure that the 
corporations benefiting from state aid did not get an unfair advantage in the market place. By 
limiting the gains to organizations receiving state aid, competition policy helps (indirectly) to 
mitigate moral hazard.  
State aid granted in the context of the Global Crisis and the European Single Market 
highlights  a  number  of  very  important  points.  First,  European  state  aid  rules  proved 
compatible  with  the  urgent  need  to  avoid  a  systemic  financial  meltdown  and  to  provide 
support to mitigate the social and economic consequences of the crisis. Clearly,  the collapse of 
an institution, located in any one Member State, could, in the midst of financial turmoil, lead 
to systemic consequences spreading throughout the Single Market. The global fallout could 
also be considerable. In the language of the game-theoretic framework presented in section 2, 
the avoidance of a systemic collapse is very close to the extreme concept of a pure public 
good. Forceful, effective action is in the best interest of Europe and of the rest of the world.  
Second, the framework that protects the integrity of the Single Market originates in 
the Treaty. Market integration is at the core of the process of European integration. Therefore, 
preserving the existences and stability of the Single Market is a key common good for all 
Member States. This is the prime justification for competition policies and state aid rules. In 
general terms, recipients of aid have to produce a restructuring program that allows them to 
return to viability under "normal" market conditions. At the same time, fair conditions for 
competition should be available to the recipient firm's competitors.  
A crucial question is: Are the EU rules sufficiently robust to avoid the fragmentation of 
the Single Market under severe crisis circumstances? There are reasons to be optimistic.  As 
described above, the Single market is a rules-based construction that is resilient and self-
correcting. Deviations from a level-playing field have to be justified and temporary. The Treaty 24 
 
and subsequent jurisprudence foresee corrective measures in cases of violations on the part of 
Member States. European institutions, the European Commission, and the European Court of 
Justice all play crucial roles. At the same time, the Global Crisis has shown that Member States 
are  well  aware  of  the  interdependencies  and  spillover  effects  associated  with  the  Single 
Market and, therefore, welcome the role of the Commission in the protection of competition 
in the single European market. 
Third, state-aid control may (indirectly) help to control moral hazard, by examining and 
approving  restructuring  plans  and  through  coordination  among  competent  authorities  in 
Member States, namely by clarifying the “rules of the game.”
28  In both roles – that is, in 
containing moral hazard and helping coordination -- state-aid control has the potential for 
playing an anchoring role, given that the competition authority (the European Commission) 
moves last. Some further comments on these issues will be made in sub-section C below. 
In the language of section 2, Member States, well aware of the dangers associated 
with the possibility of free-riding or encroachment by national authorities in the context of the 
single  European  market,  have  resorted  to  third-party  enforcement  through  the  European 
Commission  and  the  European  Court  of  Justice.  This  institutional  framework offers  strong 
assurances protecting a level-playing field. 
 
B.  European cross-border financial regulation and supervision. 
 
   The  global  crisis  revealed  significant  weaknesses  in  the  framework  for  supervising 
financial institutions in all major financial centers.  As a result, there is now greater recognition 
in the EU of the need for closer cooperation to minimize the costs of cross-border spillovers 
and  negative  externalities.  The  crisis  has  shown  that  supervision  of  individual  financial 
institutions in isolation is not enough. Large and interconnected financial organizations may 
create system wide disturbance. The same applies to market infra-structures – e.g. payments 
systems  and  securities  settlements  systems.  The  cross-border  challenges  are  particularly 
complex.  It  is  necessary,  therefore,  to  deal  with  financial  systemic  risk  through  macro-
prudential supervision at the European level. But, even at the micro-level, it is necessary to 
organize regulatory and supervisory activities so as to internalize the cross-border dimension. 
As identified in the de Larosière report (see above) this entails a single rule book for financial 
supervision  applied  consistently  throughout  the  single  market  in  order  to  ensure  a  level 
playing field and to avoid regulatory arbitrage. It also calls for a dispute settlement mechanism 
in case of conflicting practices by national supervisory authorities. 
EU leaders and policy makers were energized by the crisis to reconsider the European 
financial-stability  framework  or  architecture.  The  European  Commission  has  assumed  a 
leadership  role  in  the  process  of  formulating  recommendations  for  establishing  a  new 
European financial framework and architecture aimed at safeguarding EU financial stability 
                                                           
28 See Nguyen and Praet (2010) and Dewatripont, Nguyen, Praet and Sapir (2010) for more detailed 
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(see Box 1 on Timeline for EU Financial Architecture Reform). The process started on October 
8,  2008  when  President  Barroso  established  a  high-level  group,  chaired  by  Jacques  de 
Larosière, to consider and propose EU financial sector reforms. 
The culmination of this process is manifest in the Commissions legislative proposals of 
September 23, 2009, following the recommendations in the de Larosière report (released on 
February 25, 2009) to enhance the EU's ability to safeguard European economic stability as 
well as national financial stability.
29 At the time of writing (June 2010), the legislative proposals 
were progressing in the context of a process of co -decision (involving both the Council of 
Ministers and the European Parliament). The proposed European supervisory reform foresees 
the  creation of a European Systemic Risk Board
30  and three new European  supervisory 
authorities: the European Banking Authority ,
31  the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority,
32 and the European Securities and Markets Authority.
33 
The proposed legislation addresses problems both at the macro-prudential and at the 
micro-prudential  level.  At  the  macro -prudential  level,  the  draft  legislation  proposes  to 
establish the European Systemic Risk Board with the responsibility for identifying and assessing 
EU systemic risks and vulnerabilities.  The new organization may  issue warnings and make 
recommendations.  
At the micro-prudential level, the legislation would establish a new European System 
of Financial Supervision (ESFS) comprised of three separate supervisory authorities to oversee 
institutions providing banking, securities, and insurance and pension finan cial services.  If 
enacted into law, the ESFS will have (i) the responsibility to establish a single European 'rule 
book' for national supervisors (ii) the authority to resolve disagreements between different 
national authorities  and  (iii) competence  to coordinate actions during a crisis ( which the 
European Commission will have the authority to declare).    
In the jargon of the models described in Section 2, the objective of this new EU 
approach to financial supervision and surveillance would be to provide conditions favoring the 
emergence of cooperative and efficient solutions. Such solutions  internalize even further the 
unavoidable  spillover  effects  deriving  from  national  orientations  that  now  prevail.  The 
proposals should be regarded as opening an evolutionary process. The creation of the EFSB 
and the ESFS provide structures where enduring interaction will take place . They facilitate 
communication and information sharing among the competent authorities  as well as  peer 
review and monitoring. Theoretical results as well as empirical and experimental evidence all 
suggest that these reforms would encourage and support cooperation.  
The establishment of a single European rule book in the area of financial supervision 
would be a further important step in the direction of a level playing field in the Single Market. 
It would complement the state aid rules discussed in the previous sub-section. However, as in 
                                                           
29 At the time of the writing of this paragraph (June 2010) the European legislative process was on-going 
and the package was on track for approval. 
30 COM (2009) 499, 23.09.2009. 
31 COM (2009) 501, 23.09.2009. 
32 COM (2009) 502, 23.09.2009. 
33 COM (2009), 503, 23.09.2009. 26 
 
Dixit (1996), it is clear that the situation is too complex and the way is too uncertain to allow 
for any presumption of optimality. 
The new architecture will face difficult challenges. For example, while the European 
Systemic Risk Board has responsibilities for macro-prudential supervision and systemic risk at 
European level, it lacks specific instruments to prevent and to manage those risks.  Once the 
ESRB  has  identified  a  specific  risk,  it  can  signal  warnings  and  make  recommendations  to 
specific country authorities, but compliance will depend on actions taken by the authorities 
and not the ESRB. Schinasi (2009) stresses that the recommendations of the ESRB are not 
binding  and  the  responsibility  for  taking  policy  action  remains  in  the  hands  of  national 
authorities. The ESRB has been conceived as a reputational body that will have to depend on 
its high-level composition
34 to provide weight to  its recommendations. 
The ESRB will also be granted the right to get all relevant inf ormation to assess 
systemic  risk.  As  documented  in  Schinasi  (2009),  the  proposed  legislation  imposes  the 
obligation to provide all information necessary for the performance of the ESRB’s duties on the 
European  Supervisory  Authorities,  the  National  Central  Banks,  and other  relevant  national 
authorities. Proper and timely access to information is likely to be one of the most formidable 
tests the newly established ESRB will face and have to overcome if it is to be successful in 
managing systemic risk. 
At a more general level, the relation between monetary stability and financial stability 
both  at  the  level  of  the  definition  of  the  monetary  policy  stance  and  of  monetary  policy 
implementation will likely be a central issue that raises many questions and challenges.  
One  financial-stability  policy  area  where  the  current  situation  may  be  far  from  a 
Coasian equilibrium is the framework for financial-crises management and in particular the 
resolution of troubled (near insolvent or insolvent) financial institutions with significant cross-
border exposures. In the language of game-theory the problems are twofold. First, in the 
context  of  a  crisis  (in  particular  one  with  significant  cross-border  spillovers),  supervisory 
authorities will be pressed by the complexity of the situation and by the urgency of action. In 
the absence of effective and timely coordination mechanism, information asymmetries will 
severely  test  the  ability  to  formulate  and  implement  solutions  during  crisis  periods  when 
opportunities for communication will be limited and the costs of waiting prohibitive. Second, 
intervention by supervisory authorities in troubled financial organizations is justified by the 
protection of consumers and investors, by concerns about contagion and systemic stability, 
and to minimize costs to taxpayers. The latter mandate could create conflicts of interest and 
present tradeoffs for different national authorities in choosing between solutions that protect 
national taxpayers and those that safeguard European financial stability. Such conflicts are 
particularly likely and costly when it comes to the burden sharing of the costs of resolution. 
Therefore, it is safe to conclude that when it is necessary to intervene in large, interconnected 
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voting members. The voting members will be the President and Vice-President of the ECB, the governors 
of the national central banks, a member of the European Commission and the chairpersons of the three 
new European supervision authorities. The non-voting members will be High-Level Member State 
representatives (on behalf of the competent national supervisory authorities) – one per country – and 
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cross-border active financial organizations in a crisis, cooperation is made difficult by high 
costs of bargaining and communication, asymmetric information, and conflicting preferences. 
Resolution of systemically important international financial institutions is discussed next. 
 
C.  European bank insolvency resolution regimes 
 
The regime to deal with distressed banks is a key component of the regulatory and 
supervisory framework. Unfortunately it is one of the aspects that has been least discussed.
35 
European policy makers have attempted to address this issue over the years, but it has taken a 
long time to reach a consensus and the outcome has been regarded as unsatisfactory for 
resolving institutions – as the crisis has revealed.  
 
As early as 1988, the EU tabled a proposal for a directive on the resolution of credit 
institutions. However, it was not until 2001 that the Directive on Reorganization and Winding-
up  of  Credit  Institutions  was  finally  adopted  (Directive  2001/24/EC).  Moreover,  it  is  only 
recently  that  the  directive  has  been  transposed,  into  national  legislation,  in  all  member 
countries. There is not much literature analyzing this directive, but authors seem to agree that 
it has not advanced the convergence or integration of EU member states’ resolution regimes 
very far.
36, 37 
                                                           
35 The situation is changing fast. See, for example, Dewatripont, Rochet and Tirole (2010) and Claessens, 
Herring and Schoenmaker (2010) which also include complete references. The official community is also 
moving along this track (see, for example, Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (2010) and European 
Commission (2010).  
36 According to Čihák and Nier (2009): "The Directive stipulates that the competent authorities of the 
home  country  that  granted  the  banking  license  has  sole  power  to  initiate  and  implement  all 
reorganization measures provided for in the law of the home country and that these measures have full 
effect throughout the EU. This adopts the “single-entity” and “universality principles for all European 
banking institutions and ensures that resolution measures taken by the home authority apply equally to 
all cross-border branches. These principles do not however apply to the case where a banking institution 
entertains (wholly-owned) subsidiaries in a different country within the EU. Such a subsidiary is viewed 
instead as a legally separate entity with a separate license. For subsidiaries, therefore, it still holds that 
insolvency  proceedings  can  be  brought  in  every  jurisdiction  where  a  failed  bank  maintains  an 
establishment. This is an important constraint, because much of the recent cross-border expansion in 
European banking markets has been through subsidiaries. Matters become very complex for a LCFI 
[large complex financial institution] with numerous branches and operationally-integrated subsidiaries." 
37 Likewise, according to Garcia, Lastra, and Nieto (2009): “The objectives of the Directive 2001/24/EC 
are rather narrow and, in accordance with the objectives of the treaty, mainly aimed at the elimination 
of “any obstacles to the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services within the 
Community.” The directive is neither particularly aimed at preserving EU financial stability nor at limiting 
public and private costs of bank crisis resolution. Directive 2001/24/EC does not seek to harmonize 
national  legislation  concerning  reorganization  measures  and  winding-up  proceedings  (including  a 
common  rule  of  bank  closure),  rather  it  ensures  mutual  recognition  and  coordination  of  these 
procedures by the member States of the EU, based upon the principle of home-country control, as well 
as the necessary cooperation between authorities. It embraces the principles of unity and universality 
single entity approach to liquidation, and the equal treatment of creditors. In spite of the far reaching 
effects, the Directive is subject to interpretation as the definition of reorganization measures and the 
definition of winding-up proceedings contained in the Directive are open definitions. As a result, the 28 
 
  As Claessens, Herring, and Schoenmaker (2010) make clear, the resolution of cross 
border systemic financial institutions is particularly problematic. In the context of the Global 
Crisis they present several case studies. The case of Lehman Brothers at the global level, and of 
Fortis at the European level, are particularly clear. As stressed before, the need to act, quickly 
and forcefully within a crisis situation implies that action will have to be taken in a national 
context. It is so for mainly two reasons. First, the financial costs and risks associated with 
rescue operations will be borne ultimately by national taxpayers. Second, the resolution and 
insolvency  regime,  as  well  as  the  authority  to  determine  resolution,  are  set  in  national 
legislation.  
The  resolution  of  cross-border  financial  institutions  represents  a  most  revealing 
example of the fundamental tension alluded to above   between a decentralized, national 
financial  regulatory  and  supervisory  architecture  founded  on  home-country  control  and 
mutual recognition, on the one hand and a Single Market and European financial integration 
that actively encourages private organizations to ignore national boundaries, on the other 
hand. The example is most revealing because there are reasons why voluntary cooperation will 
not be effective in this context. 
  It is worthwhile to spell out the reasons: First, solvency problems affecting systemically 
important financial institutions (SIFIs) have been rare events. From the viewpoint of the game-
theoretic framework there is not enough repetition to support cooperative outcomes based on 
iterated interaction. The problem is made worse given that contagion and systemic risk imply 
that several SIFIs will be affected at the same time. It is therefore easy to perceive them as 
unique events requiring unique solutions. If that is the perception then the outcome is likely to 
be close to a non-cooperative of Nash equilibrium. Second, support and rescue operations 
entail financial costs and financial risks. These financial burdens have to be shared among 
relevant stakeholders. At the ex post stage burden sharing is a zero-sum game. According to 
national  legislation  the  authorities’  fiduciary  responsibilities  are  representative  of  national 
taxpayers.  Moreover,  bargaining  about  financing  is  an  obstacle  to  effective  information-
sharing. Freixas (2003) has shown that truthful revelation of information can only be predicted 
in game-theoretic equilibrium when the sharing rule does not depend on the information 
provided. This cannot be achieved when crisis-time bargaining and information-sharing are 
progressing in real time.  
Third,  in  a  financial  crisis  action  is  pressing.  The  costs  of  waiting  are  very  high. 
Therefore the costs associated with communication and bargaining are severe. It is hard to 
imagine  a  situation  further  from  the  conditions  of  the  Coase  Theorem.  More  explicitly, 
improvised cooperation, based on the perception of collective gains, is not likely to be enough 
to support effective or even approximately effective cooperation. Compared with the other 
areas  discussed  earlier  in  this  section,  the  situation  concerning  early  intervention, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
range of measures foreseen by national law and falling under the Directive’s definition of reorganization 
measures  and  winding-up  procedures  is  rather  varied.  In  addition,  the  responsible  authority 
(administrative or judicial) and the grounds that trigger the reorganization and winding up procedures 
vary within EU countries.” The paper further analyzes the directive in some detail and recommends 
revisions  to  it  that  more  directly  aim  at  maintaining  financial  stability  and  minimizing  the  costs  of 
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restructuring,  resolution,  and  liquidation  of  cross-border,  systemic  financial  institutions  is 
closest to the sub-optimal, non-cooperative Nash outcome. Ex ante institutional arrangements 
are necessary. 
  The Basle Committee (2009) has made a number of comments with respect to the 
experience with Fortis. From our viewpoint the crucial remarks are: 
  “The Fortis case illustrates the tension between the cross-border nature of a group and 
national frameworks and responsibilities for crisis management. This led to a solution along 
national lines (…) Despite a long-standing relationship in on-going supervision and information 
sharing,  the  Dutch  and  Belgian  supervisory  authorities  assessed  the  situation  differently. 
Differences in the assessment of available information and the sense of urgency complicated 
the situation.” 
  As the Basle Committee highlights, the case of Fortis is particularly telling as it involves 
the three Benelux countries (certainly among the closest integrated countries in the world at 
the forefront of European integration). If voluntary cooperation did not work well in this case it 
can hardly be expect to perform reliably, in general. 
  One of the lessons of the global crisis is that many systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFIs) collectively engaged in excessive risk taking and leverage. This ultimately 
posed risks to global economic and financial stability. After the fact, it is clear that one factor 
that may have contributed to this is the moral hazard associated with the presumption of SIFIs 
and their creditors and shareholders that they would not be allowed to fail because of their 
size, complexity, and interconnectedness.  
A solution to this problem that is taking shape is to create ‘ex ante’ incentives for 
avoiding excessive risk taking by SIFIs. One element of this is the establishment of a wind up 
procedure (perhaps accompanied by an ex ante private pre-funded financing mechanism) that 
is fully transparent, legally binding, operationally implementable, and capable of liquidating 
and closing an errant SIFI without resort to taxpayer funds. In effect, such a procedure would 
provide clear ex ante incentives to avoid excessive risk taking because the cost of insolvency 
would be liquidation and not rescue. That is, this policy can prevent crises by making it clear 
that  the  ‘end  game’  for  a  SIFI  that  engages  in  excessive  risk  taking  and  gambling  for 
resurrection by SIFIs is its demise.   
We represent the more general situation of moral hazard, schematically in Figure 3. 
Starting from the right-most box we list the criteria that are relevant to evaluate outcomes. 
The idea is to reconcile the European single financial market with financial stability, thereby 
resolving the fundamental tension discussed in this paper. Policy-makers want to achieve such 
an outcome in a way that is compatible with a highly performing financial system evaluated by 
its  ability  to  efficiently  allocate  available  savings  to  investment  opportunities;  to  provide 
instruments  for  risk  spreading  and  risk  diversification;  to  produce  and  provide  relevant 
information and, finally, to provide payments services. A highly performing financial system is, 
in turn, strongly associated with growth and development.  30 
 
  In turn, the objectives of financial regulation are: to protect consumers and investors; 
to minimize the use of taxpayers’ money; and, finally, to reduce the likelihood of systemic 
financial crises and to reduce their costs when they occur. 
  Figure 3 suggests that no matter how resilient individual financial organizations or the 
overall financial system may be it is not realistic to assume that the probability of distress in 
individual banks or of a systemic event is negligible. That is so because individual organizations 
and the system are subject and interact with micro and macro-disturbances. If the disturbance 
is sufficiently severe even a very resilient system will collapse. 
  Actions taken by individual actors (e.g. bank managers and bank supervisors) crucially  
depend on the outcome  in the event of distress. This explains the first instance of moral 
hazard in Figure 3: the likelihood of distress depends on preventive and risk management 
actions  by  relevant  actors.  Actors’  incentives,  in  turn,  are  dependent  on  their  beliefs  and 
expectations  concerning  the  end  game.  After  the  manifestation  of  distress,  the  crisis 
management process itself creates a second opportunity for moral hazard as beneficiaries of 
aid try to make the best of the situation from their own specific viewpoint (e.g. they may 
gamble for resurrection).  
The bottom line of this way of seeing the challenge is obvious. Clarity about the rules 
of the game, in general, and the end game, in particular, is crucial in order to contain moral 
hazard by providing corrective incentives for risk management. 
  It is foreseen (EC Commission, 2010b) that, in October 2010, the European Commission 
will publish a complete action plan for crisis management. It will include a set of tools for 
prevention and resolution of failing banks. A full legislative proposal is envisaged for the spring 
of 2011 with the aim of reaching political agreement before the end of the year. 
   
 
 
   
 
 




“Ideally,  a  situation  should  be  reached  in  which  the  group  of  European  supervisors  works 
collectively as a single supervisor, when needed. This is required when the problems involved 
are area-wide – because of the institutions or markets involved – or there are concerns of 
systemic problems spreading across borders”, Willem Duisenberg, 2000. 
 
The  Global  Crisis  provides  us  with  an  opportunity  to  reflect  on  the  circumstances  of 
international cooperation.  The crisis motivated urgent action at the national level and with a 
national focus. Indeed most policy actions taken were national. 
At the same time, the Global Crisis was associated with very strong international linkages and 
spillover effects. Nowhere were they stronger than in the European Union. This motivated an 
unprecedented willingness  on  the  part  of  sovereign  nations to  engage  in  joint  action  and 
multilateral  cooperation.  Such  willingness  was  manifest  in  countries  commitment  to 
multilateral  organizations  (e.g.  the  WTO)  and  in  their  initiatives  to  organize  multilateral 
processes in innovative ways (e.g. meeting of the G-20 and of the Euro Group at level of Heads 
of State and Government). 
The focus of this paper is financial stability and policy cooperation in the EU. 
In  the  paper,  we  use  the  language  and  logic  of  game  theory  to  examine    conflict  and 
cooperation in the formulation of policies to safeguard European financial stability. In the 
context  of  the  Global  Crisis,  we  examined  the  on-going  opportunities  and  challenges  to 
establish a new European framework for financial supervision and regulation. We contrasted 
the extreme cases of the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium and Coase equilibria. We reviewed 
theoretical results, experimental evidence, and case studies that suggest that self-sustained, 
spontaneous (improvised) cooperation is more likely when: first, the situation is repeated and 
the  time  horizon  of  relevant  players  is  long;  second,  there  are  ample  opportunities  for 
monitoring and communication (information exchange); third, the number of players needed 
for an effective solution is limited; fourth, players have similar (compatible) interests; fifth, 
there are graduated penalties for deviating behavior (gradual incentives). 
In the paper we examined three areas of policy relevant for the financial system: competition 
policy; European supervisory framework for financial supervision and regulation (follow-up for 
de Larosière report); and the very specific case of intervention and resolution of distressed 
cross-border systemic financial organizations.   
In the paper we argued that both European financial integration and systemic stability at the 
European level should be regarded as European public goods (in the context of models such as 
those of Olson and Zechauser (1966) and Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986)). 
In the context of the Global Crisis, EU competition policy was implemented to avoid distortions 
to competition and to ensure a level playing field in the European single financial market. The 32 
 
European Commission allowed scope for urgent action to foster systemic financial stability 
while at the same time it maintained pressure for the adoption of remedial actions to protect 
the  single  market.  We  argued  that  the  competition  framework  was  able  to  achieve  its 
objectives  under  pressure  because  it  relied  on  a  clear  ex  ante  institutional  allocation  of 
responsibilities  (competition  policy  is  an  exclusive  responsibility  of  the  EU) and  on  a  long 
experience of compliance in many different sectors of economic activity. 
In the area of European regulation and supervision, the Global Crisis energized EU 
leaders  and  policy  makers  to  reconsider  the  European  financial-stability 
framework/architecture. The European Commission assumed a leadership role in the process 
of formulating recommendations for establishing a new European financial framework and 
architecture  aimed  at  safeguarding  EU  financial  stability.  The  process  started  with  the 
proposals  from  Larosière  Group  established  by  EU  Commission  President  Barroso.  The 
legislative process is now in progress according to the co-decision procedure. According to the 
proposals, a new European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) is being created to deal with macro-
prudential issues. Additionally, three new supervisory authorities  are being created at the 
European  level:  the  European  Banking  Authority  (EBA),  the  European  Insurance  and 
Occupational  Pensions  Authority  (EIOPA)  and  the  European  Securities  Markets  Authority 
(ISMA). In our view, the new framework constitutes important progress. It creates, among 
other important elements, a relevant forum to review systemic risks and authorities mandated 
to  create  a  “single  rule  book”  leading  to  uniform  supervisory  practices  within  the  single 
market. The new legislation starts a process which, as time goes by, may gradually approach 
cooperative solutions. 
Last but not least, we examined the questions of resolution of cross-border, systemic 
financial institutions. We argued that, under current rules, the situation is not far from a non-
cooperative Nash solution. Once authorities have to face the challenge of rescuing financial 
organizations  in  the  context  of  a  systemic  event,  conditions  are  not  conducive  to  the 
spontaneous emergence of effective cooperative solutions. In particular, ex post authorities 
are under tremendous time pressure – leading to very high bargaining and communications 
costs – have conflicting goals – for example concerning sharing the financial costs and risks – 
and will be reluctant to share information. Once a crisis is in full swing,   authorities no longer 
have  feasible  efficient  solutions  to  choose  from.  The  way  forward  is  to  have  ex  ante  an 
institutional framework in which solutions can be quickly developed and implemented without 
the bias for national solutions to dominate European ones. Such an institutional framework 
would help in reaching international cooperative outcomes and help to contain many varieties 
of moral hazard.  
To quote Duisenberg (see epigraph to this concluding section): “… a situation should 
be  reached  in  which  the  group  of  European  supervisors  works  collectively,  as  a  single 
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Figure 2: Nash and Coase in the Private Provision of Public Goods Model. 
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Box 1: Timeline for EU Financial Architecture Reform 
 
October 8, 2008: President Barroso establishes the high-level group headed by Jacques de 
Larosière to consider and propose EU financial sector reforms. 
February 25, 2009: The de Larosière Group issues its report recommending the creation of a 
European Systemic Risk Council (now Board) to improve the assessment and identification 
of EU “systemic risk” at the macro-prudential level and a new European System of Financial 
Supervision comprising supervisory agencies for banking, securities, and insurance and 
occupational pensions institutions at the micro-level. 
March 2009: EU communications in which the de Larosière recommendations receive 
broad EU endorsement with some reservations about not removing sovereign fiscal 
authority regarding the costs of maintaining financial stability. 
May 27, 2009: European Commission Communications details its plans for drafting 
legislation and implementing reforms, endeavoring to have a new system operating in 
2010. 
June 19-20, 2009: Brussels European Council Presidency conclusions agree overall outline of 
reforms with reservations about sovereign fiscal responsibility and binding mediation.  
September 23, 2009: European Commission issues draft legislation proposals foreseeing the 
creation of a European Systemic Risk Board and European Supervisory Authorities. 
Current status (as of June 2010): co-decision (involving the Council of Ministers and the 




Table 1:  Measures taken by the Commission concerning state aid to combat the crisis 





19 August.2009  Communication from the Commission on The return to viability and the 
assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis 
under the State aid rules 
10 August.2009  DG Competition's review of guarantee and recapitalisation schemes in the 
financial sector in the current crisis 
7 April 2009  Communication from the Commission - Temporary framework for State aid 
measures to support access to finance in the current financial and economic crisis 
(consolidated version) 
29 February 2009  Communication from the Commission on the Treatment of Impaired Assets in the 
Community Banking sector 
25 February 2009  Communication from the Commission on the Amendment of the Temporary 
framework for State aid measures to support access to finance in the current 
financial and economic crisis 
17 December 2008  Communication from the Commission - Temporary framework for State aid 
measures to support access to finance in the current financial and economic crisis 
5 December 2008  Communication from the Commission on Recapitalisation of financial institutions 
in the current financial crisis: limitation of the aid to the minimum necessary and 
safeguards against undue distortions of competition 
25 October 2008  Communication from the Commission on The application of State aid rules to 
measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current 
global financial crisis 
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